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Overruling the Jury:
Duncan v. GMC and Appellate Treatment
of Hostile Work Environment Judgments
Dara Purvis'+
Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002)
INTRODUCTION

In August of 1994, Diana Duncan began work as a technical training clerk
at the General Motors Corporation manufacturing plant in Wentzville,
Missouri, placed through the Junior College District of St. Louis. Within the
first two weeks of her employment, James Booth, the GMC employee who had
first told her about the available clerk position, asked Duncan to meet with him
at a restaurant during work hours. Although it is unclear whether Booth
actually had supervisory powers over Duncan, she and the other workers
employed through the Junior College District believed that he had the authority
to promote them, terminate them, or change their salaries.' At the restaurant,
Booth sexually propositioned Duncan. After she rebuffed his advances,
Booth's conduct towards Duncan at work became negative and often
inappropriate. He repeatedly requested that she use his computer in order to use
a particular software program, after he set the computer's screensaver to be an
image of a naked woman. 3 He arranged to have Duncan mock-arrested for a
charity fundraiser, even though he was told Duncan had just prosecuted a
person who assaulted her and then threatened to have her falsely arrested. After
participants were "arrested" at the GMC plant, they were held until someone
paid their "bail" in the form of a donation. Booth paid Duncan's bail, but rather
than taking her back to work as she requested, he drove her to a bar across the
street from the apartment where she had been assaulted.4
When Duncan requested a promotion to a position as illustrator, rather than

t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2008. M.Phil., University of Cambridge, 2005. B.A., University
of Southern California, 2003. The author wishes to thank Professor Jeffrey G. Purvis, James T. Gibson,
Wally Adeyemo, Monica C. Bell, and Ebunoluwa Taiwo for their valuable comments, as well as Geneva
McDaniel for her insightful editing.
I. Duncan v. Junior Coll. Dist., No. 4:98CV01221, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22451, at *4 (E.D. Mo.
Nov. 15, 1999).
2. Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2002).
3. Id.
4. Duncan, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22451, at *5.
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evaluate her drawing skills by having her draw automotive parts, as all other
applicants were required to do, Booth told Duncan that she would have to draw
a planter he kept in his office shaped like a man with a cactus growing out of
his groin.5 Booth later, along with another coworker, drew a poster depicting
Duncan as the President and CEO of the "Man Hater's Club," requiring that
members "always be in control of... (Ugh) Sex," which they then posted on a
bulletin board in the office. After Booth gave Duncan a draft of the "He-Man
Women Hater's Club" charter to type up for him, calling for, among other
things, repealing the Nineteenth Amendment, Duncan resigned and later filed a
6
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Duncan's suit against General Motors Corporation was eventually tried
before a jury, which found that she had been sexually harassed under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act. 7 The jury awarded her $4600 in back pay and
$1,000,000 in emotional distress damages on both her sexual harassment claim
8
and her claim of constructive discharge.
After the judgment, General Motors filed a post-trial motion seeking
reversal of the verdict on a number of grounds, including a request for
judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that the incidents described by
Duncan did not rise to the level of altering the terms of her employment. The
district judge denied this motion. 9 General Motors then appealed from that
denial to a panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing inter alia that
because the Supreme Court had "rejected the notion that workplace conduct
must pass muster with Miss Manners," the verdict for Duncan should be
overturned as a matter of law.' 0 The appellate panel reversed the district court's
denial of judgment and set aside the jury's verdict, stating that while Booth's
conduct toward Duncan at work was "boorish, chauvinistic, and decidedly
immature," it did not "meet the standard necessary for actionable sexual
harassment" because it did not create "a sexually harassing hostile environment
sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her
employment.' ' l l The full Eighth Circuit split 4-4 on whether to hear the case en
banc, and the Supreme Court declined Duncan's petition for certiorari. 12
Duncan is a paradigmatic example of the confusing state of sexual
harassment law at the appellate level today. The Supreme Court's definition of
what constitutes sexual harassment is a malleable standard that resists easy or
5. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 931-32.
6. Id. at 932.
7. Id. at 930.
8. Id. at 930-31.
9. Id. at 933.
10. Brief of Appellant at 30, Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 00-3544, 2000 WL 33983440 (8th
Cir. Dec. 22, 2000).
11. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 935.
12. Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 538 U.S. 994 (2003).
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quantifiable analysis-but this flexibility was intentionally created in order to
respect the intent of Congress to leave the primary evaluation of sexual
harassment claims (brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1991) in the hands of
a jury. 13 Rather than remain as a last restraint upon damages which are
"disproportionate to the defendants' discriminatory conduct or the plaintiffs'
resulting loss,"' 14 however, an increasing number of appellate courts have taken
an activist path, consciously tightening the standard that plaintiffs in sexual
harassment suits must meet, carving out safe harbors for offensive behavior of
employers, and discounting the judgment of both the average woman facing
harassing behavior and the jury meant to be a pool of her working peers. This
tension between the role that Congress and the Supreme Court intended the jury
to play in sexual harassment suits-and the increasing willingness of some
appellate courts to impose their own determination in place of the jury's-has
become an obstacle blocking plaintiffs like Diana Duncan and protecting
employers who sexually harass their employees.
In the first Part of this Comment, I review the sexual harassment doctrine as
established by the Supreme Court. I note the unresolved issue of whether the
establishment of a hostile work environment is a question of law or fact, an
ambiguity that has found differing treatments among different appellate courts
and even different decisions by the same court. In Part II, I argue that what
seems to be a gap in the Supreme Court's reasoning is in fact an
acknowledgement of Congress's intent that a jury make the determination
about whether a hostile work environment was created. In Part III, I explain
how the Duncan opinion embodies several typical strategies used by appellate
courts to dismiss the judgment ofjuries and reverse verdicts that were favorable
toward sexual harassment plaintiffs. Finally, I note the danger that the growing
pattern of appellate court reversals of jury verdicts presents to future claimants
alleging sexual harassment in their workplaces.
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT DOCTRINE AND THE QUESTION OF FACT OR LAW

The Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 15 in which the
Court adopting the EEOC's 1980 guidelines that an employee could establish
sexual harassment by demonstrating that sexual discrimination resulted in a

13. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 72 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 610
(citation omitted); see also Mendoza v. Borden 195 F.3d 1238, 1278 (1lth Cir. 1999) (Barkett, J.,
concurring in part) ("The mistrust of juries evidenced by the majority is at odds with the specific
directive of Congress [in the Civil Rights Act of 1991] that the jury is to decide whether gender
discrimination has occurred in the workplace.").
14. H.R. REP.No. 102-40, pt. 1,at 72.
15. 477 U.S. 57 (1996).
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hostile or abusive work environment. 16 This is a different allegation than a quid
pro quo claim of sexual harassment, in which sexual conduct is explicitly
linked to a promotion, continued employment, or some other tangible economic
good. Despite repeatedly affirming the distinction between the two, the Court
has tended to minimize the significance of the categories, stating that "[t]o the
extent they illustrate the distinction between cases involving a threat which is
carried out and offensive conduct in general, the terms are relevant .... ,17
The division, however, is more important for the purposes of appellate
review of jury verdicts than the Court's description indicates. When reviewing
the judgment of a trial court, questions of fact that were determined by a jury
are given deferential treatment by the appellate court. In contrast, questions of
law are reviewed by the appellate court de novo. Whether a given issue is one
of fact or law, therefore, indicates
how easy or exceptional a circumstance it is
18
for a judgment to be overturned.
In the context of sexual harassment, this means that a finding of quid pro
quo sexual harassment is generally deferred to on appeal, while the treatment of
hostile work environment claims varies by circuit and often involves less
deference. In a quid pro quo suit of harassment, the question of whether sexual
harassment occurred is essentially a purely factual question: if a threat actually
took place in which an employer threatened an employee with retribution
unless the employee engaged in sexual activity, there is little question that
sexual harassment occurred. 19 In contrast, a claim of sexual harassment by
creation of a hostile work environment is a mixed question of both fact and
law. There are the factual inquiries of whether the specific incidents alleged by
the plaintiff indeed took place. After the factual determination, there is the
further legal question of whether the facts as established rise to the level of a
hostile work environment.
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance as to what creates a hostile
work environment, even to the extent of whether this question should be
regarded as one of law or of fact. And in the absence of that guidance, appellate
courts have issued varied opinions, some operating under the belief that the
question is a primarily factual one (thus granting jury determinations great
weight), while others subject the question to de novo consideration at the

16. Id. at 65-66.
17. Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998).
18. Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and Sexual Harassment, 17 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 813, 827 (1999).

19. Indeed, even criticisms of typical quid pro quo sexual harassment cases focus on the
responsibility of the employer based on the standard evaluating liability, rather than any further analysis
of whether the facts established settle that quid pro quo sexual harassment occurred. See Stacey Dansky,
Note, EliminatingStrict Employer Liability in Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment Cases, 76 TEX. L. REv.
435 (1997).
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appellate level.2 °
The confusion among circuits is compounded when appellate courts
reverse, alter, or simply ignore their previous understandings of sexual
harassment cases. In 1997, the Eighth Circuit noted the lack of a clear standard
set by the Supreme Court, and concluded that because "[t]here is no bright line
between sexual harassment and merely unpleasant conduct," the evaluation of a
jury "must generally stand unless there is trial error." 21 Yet in Duncan, the only
citation to the Eighth Circuit's own previous ruling was in Judge Arnold's
dissent. 22 Because the full Eighth Circuit declined to review the Duncan panel's
decision, it is unclear whether the court intended to tacitly accept a reversal of
their previous ruling, or whether the panel's disregard of precedent is a onetime aberration.
II. CONGRESS'S INTENT THAT JURIES
EVALUATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS

It is a reasonable reaction, at least at first blush, to ask why this confusion
among appellate courts is necessarily a problem. True, there is a vastly
disparate treatment of standards for sexual harassment allegations in different
appellate circuits, and courts may reverse themselves, but why should this
cause any more concern than the same varied interpretations and changing
standards in any other field of law?
The answer is that the seeming void in terms of standards, and the lack of a
precise formulation of a judge-administered test, was intentionally left
unarticulated. This superficial gray area is the product of an interpretation by
the Supreme Court: that it was Congress's intention in passing the sexual
harassment provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (establishing a right to
punitive damages determined by a jury) that jury evaluations be given great
deference in sexual harassment law. Rather than a true void in the law that
appellate courts might attempt to fill with their own independent judgments, the
evaluation of what a hostile work environment means is an analysis intended,
by Congress and the Supreme Court, to be performed by juries.
When drafting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, both the House and Senate
committees discussing the bill noted that "[a] serious gap exists in Title VII,
one that leaves victims of intentional discrimination on the basis of sex or

20. See Eric Schnapper, Some of Them Still Don't Get It: Hostile Work Environment Litigation in
the Lower Courts, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 298-99 ("In the Second and Eighth Circuits, strongly

worded opinions insist that this is a factual issue and that juries properly have the central role in its
resolution; the First, Third and Eleventh Circuits follow this approach. On the other hand, the Fourth,

Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits generally treat these issues as matters for de novo consideration by
appellate judges.").
21.

Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1997).

22.

Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 938 (8th Cir. 2002) (Arnold, J., dissenting).
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religion without an effective remedy for many forms of bias on the job, while
victims of intentional race discrimination in employment have such a
remedy. 23 In order to "conform remedies for intentional gender...
discrimination to those currently available to victims of intentional race
discrimination," 24 compensatory and punitive damages were made
available to
25
victims of gender discrimination in addition to equitable relief.
The House report noted that, under the Seventh Amendment, whenever
compensatory or punitive damages are requested, any party to the litigation
may request a jury trial. 26 The importance of ajury, however, was not simply as
a procedural requirement, as Congress stressed the reasoning power of a jury to
judge both the strength of discrimination claims and the appropriate level of
damages:
The jury system is the cornerstone of our system of civil justice, as evidenced by the
Seventh Amendment's guarantee. Just as they have for hundreds of years, juries are
fully capable of determining whether an award of damages is appropriate and if so,
how large it must be to compensate
27 the plaintiff adequately and to deter future
repetition of the prohibited conduct.
In contrast to this expansive language in praise of the judgment of juries,
the role of judges was much more narrowly circumscribed, stating that judges
would "serve as an additional check: they can and do reduce awards which are
disproportionate to the defendant's discriminatory conduct or the plaintiffs
'
resulting loss. 28

The Supreme Court recognized the deference this showed to the evaluation
of juries, cognizant of the increased sensitivity juries would likely have to the
claims of plaintiffs, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.29 Harrisestablished that
a sexual harassment charge through an abusive work environment does not
have to result in an actual psychological injury; rather, it merely must be an

environment that "would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile
or abusive." 30 Justice O'Connor noted for the Court that "this is not, and by its
nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test," 3 and Justice Scalia
acknowledged in a concurrence that the Court's opinion does not set "a very
clear standard," and "as a practical matter ...lets virtually unguided juries
decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is
egregious enough to warrant an award of damages." 32 Despite leaving sexual

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 24 (1991); S. REP. No. 101-315, at X (1991).
H.R. REP.No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 64.
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 29.
H.R. REP.No. 102-40, pt.1, at 72 (citation omitted).
Id.
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).

Overruling the Jury

harassment judgments in the hands of these "virtually unguided" juries,
to the inherently
however, Scalia concluded, "I know of no test more faithful 33
vague statutory language than the one the Court today adopts."
III.

DUNCAN AS AN EXAMPLE OF APPELLATE COURT

STRATAGEMS TO SUPPLANT THE JUDGMENT OF JURIES

Despite the direction allowing juries to apply their own standard as what a
reasonale, person would perceive as a hostile or abusive workplace, the court
in Duncan cited language from the Harris opinion as though it explicitly
demanded an extremely rigorous showing of conduct shocking to the
conscience, while discounting Duncan's experiences and reactions. In doing so,
the panel illustrated several of the most common problems that arise when
appellate courts decide that they understand the mind of the reasonable worker
better than do the members of a jury.
A chief technique in arguing that no reasonable worker could possibly have
considered challenged conduct as creating a hostile work environment is to set
the standard of what constitutes a hostile work environment extremely high.34
The opinion in Duncan accomplishes this by selectively citing Supreme Court
precedent and by imposing its own, more rigorous, interpretation upon the
language used. The panel began by stating that Duncan had fulfilled three of
the four elements required to successfully establish a claim of hostile work
environment sexual harassment: "that she was a member of a protected group,
that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment [and] that the
harassment was based on sex." 35 The panel reversed the district court's
determination that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to her, Duncan
showed that the harassment "alter[ed] a term, condition, or privilege of her
employment."

36

Citing Harris,the Eighth Circuit declared that "to clear the high threshold
of actionable harm, Duncan has to show that 'the workplace is permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,"' and denied that Duncan
demonstrated this saturation of harassment. 37 The portion of the Harrisopinion
in which the description "permeated with discriminatory intimidation" appears,
however, is hardly a list of severe conditions which must appear before a
charge of hostile work environment sexual harassment may be brought. The
previous sentence in the opinion described the "congressional intent 'to strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
33. Id. at 25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
34. See Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable
PeopleBelieve is Sexually Harassing,75 S. CAL. L. REv. 791, 809 (2002).
35. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 933.
36. Id. at 934.
37. Id. (quoting Harris,510 U.S. at 21).
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employment. ' ' 38 Justice O'Connor's later description of how to evaluate a
claim states that the factors to consider "may include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance." 39 By its selective citation,
the Duncan court portrayed the bar that Duncan had to hurdle as higher than it
actually was.
A second technique for denying the existence of a hostile work
environment is to downplay and minimize the charges alleged by the plaintiff,
even as the court claims to be "construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to [her]. ''4 The court in Duncan dismissed Duncan's allegations as
merely four categories of actions that were minor and isolated events. Booth's
requesting that Duncan accompany him to a restaurant during the working day,
telling her that his marriage was troubled (and then propositioning her) was
disregarded as "a single request for a relationship, which was not repeated
when she rebuffed it." A number of times, when Duncan was handing Booth a
phone, he would make a point of taking the phone in a way that he touched her
hand. This was glossed over as "isolated incidents of Booth briefly touching
her hand," ignoring the reason that the touching was offensive: that the contact
was not necessary and that he was clearly going out of his way to impose
physical contact upon Duncan. Demanding that Duncan draw an object that
was a crude sexual visual pun in order to apply for a higher-paying job, when
male applicants had to draw automotive parts, became "a request to draw a
planter." Posting a caricature of Duncan herself in the public area of her
workplace depicting her as a harpy who ' 4hated sexual intercourse was
disregarded as "teasing in the form of a poster. 1
The Duncan court clearly minimized the incidents Duncan described in her
testimony before the district court. The court glossed over Duncan's distress by
stating that she doubtless was made "uncomfortable" and the conduct was
"immature," but
that the incidents did not "alter the conditions of her
42
employment.,
CONCLUSION

It is notable that a common reason given for why juries make better judges
of employment conditions is that appellate judges, appointed by Presidents to
life terms, perhaps do not have the clearest picture of how a reasonable person

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Harris, 510 U.S. at2l.
Id. at 23.
Duncan, 300 F.3d at 935.
Id. at 935.
Id.
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perceives and reacts to a work environment. Even other judges have
acknowledged this: For example, the Second Circuit noted that a judge "usually
lives in a narrow segment of the enormously broad American socio-economic
spectrum, generally lacking the current real-life experience required in
interpreting subtle sexual dynamics of the workplace. ''43 When one of the most
discussed developments in sexual harassment law is the move among some
courts to a standard of the "reasonable woman" rather than the "reasonable
person, ' 44 to better understand how a woman is affected by sexual harassment.
it seems odd to say the least that the judgment of relatively privileged men who
serve as the heads of an exceedingly professional workplace is declared to be
more accurate as to the judgment of a reasonable person than twelve citizens
taken from varying walks of life and types of professions and offices.
Finally, the opinion in Duncan demonstrates one of the most troubling
aspects of overturning jury verdicts as a matter of law: the lowest common
denominator effect. The court argued that "numerous cases have rejected
hostile work environment claims premised upon facts equally or more
egregious than the conduct at issue here," then recited a laundry list of the most
appalling examples available. 45 Because telling an employee "your elbows are
the same color as your nipples," or saying that if an employee waved at police
officers people would think she was a prostitute, or asking a supervisee out and
then repeatedly trying to kiss her at work was not enough to support a claim of
hostile work environment sexual harassment, the court seemed to believe, it
would not be fair to allow Duncan's claims to proceed. 46 Every denial of a
sexual harassment charge is thus used to bolster the preliminary dismissal of
future charges in a crude balancing test: if you cannot show that your new
charges are substantially more offensive and chronic than all these examples,
you may not argue those claims before a jury.
The Duncan opinion thus demonstrates the serious flaws in the current
interpretation of hostile work environment sexual harassment claims.
Misunderstanding a grant of analytic power to the jury as a gap in the law to be
filled, the panel of the Eighth Circuit that reversed the judgment favorable to
Diana Duncan created a model of why the analytic power was granted to the
jury in the first place. The jury is the ideal evaluator of whether a set of
incidents created a hostile work environment, because the jury is made up of a
variety of people, both male and female, who work in a variety of workplaces
and have a breadth of experiences upon which to draw. The average slate of
judges, predominantly male and working in the same atypical office, simply do
not have the characteristics that Congress had in mind when giving juries the
43.
44.
45.
46.

Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998).
E.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934.
Id. at 924-25.
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power to issue judgments in sexual harassment suits. Appellate review is
intended to be a check upon judgments that are "disproportionate to the
defendants discriminatory conduct or the plaintiffs resulting lOSS, ' 4 7 not a new
application of an overly rigorous standard.

47. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.1, at 72 (1991) reprintedin U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,610.

